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COMMENT
Bush v. Gore and the Uses of "Limiting"
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,' the controversial
case that decided the 20o election, many scholars debated the meaning of the
Court's explicit admonition that its "consideration was limited to the present
circumstances. '2 The academic discussion of Bush v. Gore's precedential value
has since receded into the background. As the recent Sixth Circuit voting rights
case of Stewart v. Blackwell3 makes clear, however, the practical issue of whether
lower courts must follow Bush v. Gore- or whether the decision was only good
for the particular facts of that case -seems unlikely to disappear any time
soon.
4
In Stewart, the majority and the dissent disagreed not only about how the
Court's jurisprudence should be interpreted, but also about whether Bush v.
Gore should be treated as precedent at all. Stewart concerned disparities in
Ohio's voting technology -for example, voters who lived in counties with the
latest optical scan technology were notified if they had made any errors in their
ballots, while those who used punch-card ballots or older scanners were not.5
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Id. at lo9 (per curiam); see, e.g., Guido Calabresi, In Partial (but Not Partisan) Praise of
Principle, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 67, 80 (Bruce Ackerman ed.,
2002) ("Will history hail the courage -the willingness to risk obloquy of Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy in writing an opinion that was designed to self-destruct?"); Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 637, 650 (2001) (describing Bush v. Gore
as "the classic 'good for this train, and this train only' offer"). For contrasting views of Bush
v. Gore's precedential value, see infra note 14.
3. 444 F.3 d 843 (6th Cir. 20o6), superseded by 473 F. 3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), vacating
as moot 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
4. Cf. Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3 d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(overturning a panel decision that voting machines in California violated the equal
protection principle articulated in Bush v. Gore).
5. See 444 F.3 d at 870-71.
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The court held that Ohio had violated the Equal Protection Clause by failing to
utilize uniform voting technologies across the state.6 The case has now been
declared moot at the plaintiffs' request, 7 but the theoretical debate at the heart
of Stewart remains fundamentally unsettled.
In support of its holding, the Stewart majority relied on Bush v. Gore
extensively-quoting, citing, or mentioning the case more than twenty times.'
Judge Gilman, dissenting, sharply criticized this reliance. Bush v. Gore, Gilman
wrote, had provided clear instructions on its own use as precedent that
required "limit[ing] the reach of Bush v. Gore to the peculiar and extraordinary
facts of the case."9 The Supreme Court had given an "explicit admonition""° to
this effect. The Stewart majority's reply was straightforward: "Respectfully, the
Supreme Court does not issue non-precedential opinions."'" Noting its status
as an inferior court, one that did not have "the luxury or the power to decide
which Supreme Court decisions ...to follow,"' 2 the majority stated that it
could not ignore "the Supreme Court's murky decision in Bush v. Gore. 13
This Comment does not take a position on the merits of Bush v. Gore but
merely asks what the Court was doing when it limited its consideration "to the
present circumstances." Scholars have debated whether the language was
innocuous, indicating that the principle deciding Bush v. Gore was to be
narrowly applied (as the Stewart majority assumed), or whether the Court was
intentionally limiting the application of the equal protection rationale to only
one case (as the Stewart dissent urged). 4 This Comment looks to the Court's
past use of limiting language to try to resolve this debate.
6. See id. at 88o.
7. Stewart, 473 F.3d 692; see Howard Bashman, Sixth Circuit Deals Knock-Out Blow to Ohio
Punch-Card Voting Lawsuit, How Appealing, Jan. 13, 2007, http://howappealing.law.
cOm/0113 07 .htfll#021213 .
S. See 444 F. 3 d at 859 & nn.8-9, 86o, 861 & nn.11-13, 862, 865-66, 869 n.16, 870 & n.17, 873 &
n.22, 874 & n.23, 875 & nn.24-25, 876-77.
9. Id. at 886 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 889.
ii. Id. at 873 n.22 (majority opinion).
12. Id. at 875-76.
13. Id. at 859 n.8 (quoting id. at 88o (Gilman, J., dissenting)).
14. See Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision, in BUSH v. GORE, supra
note 2, at 3, 15 ("[E]very student of the Supreme Court knows that it is canonical for the
Court, when it decides for the first time an issue on an unusual set of facts, to issue such a
caveat. It is almost boilerplate."); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1153 n.49 (2002) (stating that the majority in Bush v. Gore acted in
a "classic minimalist fashion"); see also Owen Fiss, The Fallibility of Reason, in BUSH v. GORE,
supra note 2, at 84, 88 (asserting that disclaimers such as the one in Bush v. Gore are
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BUSH V. GORE AND THE USES OF "LIMITING"
There are, in fact, several varieties of limiting language. The Court has used
such language to narrow the scope of a principle that has been used to decide a
case, to nullify a principle that has decided a previous case, or to persuade a
future Court not to extend a ruling past the facts of the case being decided. But
Bush v. Gore's uniqueness is that it limited the case being decided "to the
present circumstances," apparently using a principle to decide a case and then
nullifying that principle in the very same case. When limiting is used to nullify
(rather than to narrow) the principle in a case, it traditionally has been used to
nullify the principle of a case that has already been decided. Bush v. Gore, I
demonstrate, is the sole exception to this rule.
I. LIMITING AS NARROWING
I begin by noting two kinds of limiting language that the Court has used to
announce that the principle behind a case is merely narrow, rather than
applicable only to the facts of a single case. When the Court decides a case and
offers reasons for its decisions, the very act of giving reasons will suggest that
the same reasons could be applied to similar circumstances. As Frederick
Schauer has put the point, "[O] rdinarily, to provide a reason for a decision is to
include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the decision
itself." s
On some occasions the Court explicitly limits the scope of the principle
behind a case, without denying that the principle remains applicable to other
circumstances. The Court can do this through one of two devices: it can state
that a previous case is "limited by its facts," or it can describe a previous case as
having a "limited holding." With these types of language, the Court draws
attention to the specific facts of the case and warns that the principle applied
should not be interpreted to extend very broadly. Both uses of limiting
language are, in the classic sense, minimalist.'
6
"commonplace in common-law decisions"). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in
THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 205, 215 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A.
Epstein eds., 2001) ("In fact this was a subminimalist opinion, giving the appearance of
having been built for the specific occasion.").
15. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 640 (1995) (emphasis omitted); see
also Fiss, supra note 14, at 88-89.
16. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
3-4 (1999).
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First, the Court may write that the "general language" of a previous
opinion "must be construed and limited by the facts of the case"17 or that "[t]he
implications of this case are limited by the facts. ''18 The point here is to caution
against an overbroad reading of the opinion rather than to deny that the
opinion has an application outside that particular case. The use of "limited by"
serves as a caveat and not as an absolute bar to future application of the case. 9
That a case is "limited by its facts" does not mean that its application is limited
only to those facts, as the Court's language in Hudson v. Palmer suggests:
"While Parratt [v. Taylor] is necessarily limited by its facts to negligent
deprivations of property, it is evident . that its reasoning applies as well to
intentional deprivations of property.""0
Second, a later Court may say that an earlier Court has "limited its holding"
to a certain set of circumstances. This use of limiting language again narrows,
rather than nullifies, the decision. The Court's goal is to limit the applicability
of the principle of a prior case to similar circumstances. Thus, when the Court
notes a prior case in which it "expressly limited [its] holding to 'the narrow
circumstances"'' 1 of that case, the term "narrow circumstances" simply
designates a limited class of circumstances, but it does not restrict the members
of that class to only the case mentioned.
17. MacKay v. Easton, 86 U.S. 619, 632 (1873); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 328
(1879) ("The language must, therefore, be limited by the facts of the case.").
18. McElroy v. United States, 455 U.S. 642, 655 n.19 (1982).
19. Cf Fried, supra note 14, at 15; see also Fiss, supra note 14, at 88 ("Such disclaimers .... do not
disavow principle, but rather warn against overreading the principle articulated.").
20. 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (discussing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).
21. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 238 n.1o (2003) (quoting Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (198o)); see also, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 125 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing a holding in an earlier
case as "expressly 'limited to those class actions which seek to bind known plaintiffs
concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments"' (quoting Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985))); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
287 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We expressly limited our holding to campaign
contributions."); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 510 n.13
(1988) ("Our holding is expressly limited to cases where an 'economically interested party
exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association
that comprises market participants."'); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 74o, 749 n.l1 (1984)
("Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a showing of probable
cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly limited to felony arrests.").
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II. LIMITING AS NULLIFICATION
When the Court limits a case to its facts, it is not trying to narrow a
principle; it is trying to void the principle of the case by restricting its
application not merely to a narrower set of circumstances but to only a single
set of facts. This makes nullification the most extreme version of narrowing,
for when the Court uses the language of "limited by" or "limited holding," it is
still announcing that a principle exists (however narrow) that can be applied
beyond a single set of circumstances.
I refer to the act of limiting a decision to its facts as nullifying the principle
behind the decision. By "nullifying" I mean that the principle should be taken
as not applying to any other cases, so that the only aspect of the case that
retains any binding force is its particular result-a decision for or against the
plaintiff. Thus, a case that has been limited to its facts has no precedential
value, and it cannot be cited as governing subsequent cases: the scope of a
limited principle is only one case (at which point we may wonder whether it is
a principle at all).22 Although limiting as nullification is not necessarily the
most common usage of limiting language," it is the central or core meaning of
the phrase "limiting a case to its own facts."
The best introduction to limiting as nullification comes not from the rare
cases in which limiting language is employed (i.e., when a case is in fact
limited), but from cases in which it is recommended or anticipated. It becomes
clear from these uses of limiting language that limiting a case is a (small) step
short of overruling the case. Thus, in one such use, Justice Kennedy warned
that a case's analysis "must be respected with reference to dwellings unless that
precedent is to be overruled or so limited to its facts that its underlying
principle is, in the end, repudiated."' Justice Thomas wrote of Mayer v.
Chicago"5 that even if a previous line of cases "were sound, Mayer was an
unjustified extension that should be limited to its facts, if not overruled. '' 6
Similarly, Justice Harlan corrected what he believed was the majority's error in
interpreting Stanley v. Georgia,7 which, "far from overruling Roth [v. United
22. Justice Rehnquist seemingly blurred this distinction in Moore v. Illinois, when he wrote that
a case had been "largely limited to its facts." 434 U.S. 220, 233 (1977). By including the word
"largely," Rehnquist implied that the case still had some precedential value.
23. See supra Part I.
24. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
25. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
26. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 141 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
27. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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States], did not even purport to limit that case to its facts."28 The unmistakable
impression from these passages is that, for the Court, limiting to the facts is
nearly the same as overruling a case, with the exception that in limiting a case
the particular result of the decision still stands. Otherwise, when a case is thus
limited, it no longer remains good law: its value as precedent is, to use Justice
Kennedy's words, "repudiated. 2 9
A. Actual Nullification
There are two primary ways in which the Court uses limiting language to
nullify. First, an opinion may actually limit an earlier case to its facts, simply by
declaring that the case has been limited to its facts or that it should be thus
read. We might call this the "performative" use of limiting to the facts3": when
a Court says it is limiting an earlier case to its facts, it is actually limiting it. This
use of limiting is arguably most akin to that of Bush v. Gore, which limited its
consideration "to the present circumstances."31 In Williams v. Union Central Life
Insurance Co., for instance, the Court distinguished the case from a lower court
decision in which "there were provisions in the [insurance] policy, quite
different from those before us, which were of doubtful meaning."3 But to
remove any doubt that the superficially similar decision might conflict with the
outcome of Williams, the Court wrote that "[t]he views expressed by the court
may be taken as limited to the facts of the particular case. 33
A more straightforward example is found in Rutkin v. United States,3 4 in
which the Court, distinguishing the case at bar from Commissioner v. Wilcox,3"
took no chances that Wilcox could still be taken to be good law and accordingly
28. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 358 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
29. Again, the point of these examples is not that the Court is actually limiting a case to its facts,
but that the Court understands what actually limiting a case to its facts entails, even when it
refers to "limiting" in an offhanded way.
30. See J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 1-11 (JO. Urmson & Marina Sbisi eds.,
2d ed. 1975).
31. It might be argued that the difference in language is significant, in that "facts" can be
limited, but the word "circumstances" inherently suggests application to other, similar
situations. But if anything, Bush v. Gore's limiting its consideration "to the present
circumstances" severely constrains any implied broadening.
32. 291 U.S. 170, 183 (1934).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
35. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
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"limit[ed] that case to its facts. ' ' 36 A later Court observed that although Rutkin
did not explicitly overrule Wilcox, it had nonetheless "thoroughly devitalized"
and "effectively vitiated" Wilcox. 7
A second way in which the Court may "limit a case to its facts" is not by
stating that the case has been limited to its facts, but by noting how a previous
case or series of cases has led to the actual nullification of its principle. Justices
may use the language of "limited to its facts" to emphasize that a prior Court
has already nullified the principle of a previous case without having expressly
said so. For example, the Court in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez noted
that Ex parte Bain'8 (on which the dissent relied) "was long ago limited to its
facts"39 by Salinger v. United States.4 ° In a more recent opinion, Justice Brennan
dismissed the majority's use of the Insular Cases41 by noting that "these cases
were limited to their facts long ago. ' 42 And one year after Bush v. Gore, Justice
Kennedy provided a good example of how a case slowly dies by first being
limited to its facts. In Lee v. Kemna, Kennedy noted that Fay v. Noia43 had been
"limited to its facts"'  in Wainwright v. Skyes 4s before finally being "put to
rest ''46 by Coleman v. Thompson.47
36. Rutkin, 343 U.S. at 138.
37. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 216-17 (1961).
38. 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
39. 462 U.S. 579, 582 n.2 (1983).
40. 272 U.S. 542 (1926). Salinger's language provides an example of limiting without using
limiting language: "The principle on which the decision proceeded," the Court wrote with
reference to Ex parte Bain, "is not broader than the situation to which it was applied." Id. at
549.
41. E.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914);
Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 19o U.S. 197 (1903).
42. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 291 (199o) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 397 n.18 (1968) ("The
Jewell-LaSalle decision must be understood as limited to its own facts."); see also Lodge 76
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 159 n.5
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). That some uses of limiting language were made by Justices
not in the majority does not prevent them from being accurate descriptions of past majority
decisions. Sometimes claims that a case has been limited will be inaccurate; when this
happens, the limiting no longer is descriptive of the past case or cases but is instead an
example of persuasive limiting language. See infra Section II.B.
43. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
44. 534 U.S. 362, 394 (2002).
4S. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
46. 534 U.S. at 394-
47. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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B. Persuasive Nullification
"Limiting to the facts" need not always be used to signify that the principle
of a case has actually been nullified. A concurring or dissenting opinion may
say that the principle announced in a case is "limited to its facts" as a way of
trying to persuade us that the case has been so limited, rather than actually
limiting the case. That is, a dissenting or concurring Justice may describe the
holding articulated by the majority as "limited to its facts" - even though the
majority itself has not stated as much-as a way of suggesting that the
principle should apply only to the instant case. The purpose of using language
in this way is to persuade a future Court to disregard the principle of the case
or to predict that a future Court will in fact disregard it. In other words, when
a Justice limits a case to its facts persuasively he or she does not actually limit
the case, but only purports to do so.4
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who frequently used persuasive limiting
language in his dissents,4 9 once concluded a dissent by stating that "[b]ecause
today's decision, though limited to its facts, disobeys this important
constitutional command, I dissent."5 There is no indication, however, that the
majority accepted this characterization of its ruling. Commentators have
described Marshall's "predictive" limiting language as "probably wishful
thinking.""1 Justice Brennan, dissenting in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, similarly
characterized the majority's opinion as "limited to its facts." 2 While the
48. For a particularly good example of "purporting" that the majority has limited the case to its
facts, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring). Ernest Young
has read Justice Breyer's opinion in this case as an example of limiting as narrowing. See
Young, supra note 14, at 1153 n.49. However, I believe it is better characterized as using
limiting language as a means of trying to persuade us that the majority has limited the case
to its facts.
49. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 870 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court's holding is necessarily limited to the facts of this case."); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 346-47 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Although I do not
countenance the sex discrimination condoned by the majority, it is fortunate that the
Court's decision is carefully limited to the facts before it."). Notably, the majority opinions
in these cases do not give any impression that the holdings were limited to the facts before
the Court.
50. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
s. Aviam Soifer & Miriam Wugmeister, Mapping and Matching DNA: Several Legal
Complications of "Accurate" Classifications, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 18 n.57 (1994).
52. 438 U.S. 726, 772 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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majority did "emphasize the narrowness" of its holding, it did not appear to
believe that it was limiting the holding to the facts of the case. 3
The distinction between actual and persuasive use of limiting language
shows the importance of its presence in the majority opinion rather than in a
concurrence or dissent. This is why it is particularly noteworthy that the
majority in Bush v. Gore limited its decision to the facts. Only the Justices in the
majority can actually limit a case to its facts; the other Justices must simply
wait and hope.
CONCLUSION
In this Comment, I have offered a taxonomy of the Supreme Court's use of
various types of limiting language. I have tried to demonstrate that the use of
limiting language by the Bush Court is historically unique. No other majority
in the history of the Court has applied limiting language to the very case being
decided; all past uses of "limiting the case to its facts" by the majority in a
decision have applied to earlier cases and not to the case being decided. If we
take this past history as governing the meaning of "limiting to its facts," then
the meaning of Bush v. Gore's limiting language (namely, that its
"consideration is limited to the present circumstances" 4) is indeed to nullify
the principle of that case. And this reading inevitably raises the deeper
theoretical question of whether the Court has the power to limit the principle
of a decision to a single case in the very case being decided and not in a later case.
If the Court must give reasons for its decisions, it is unclear whether it should
have the power to make those reasons non-general, i.e., to limit their
application beyond one set of facts.5" But this is precisely what the Court in
Bush v. Gore purported to do. s6
The Stewart decision, recently declared moot, will not force the Court to
confront its ambiguous command. Thus it still remains for lower courts to
53. Id. at 750 (majority opinion).
54. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
55. See Ronald Dworkin, Introduction to A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION 1, 1O (Ronald Dworkin ed.,
2002) ("No court can decide how far its own rulings will serve as precedents for or influence
later decisions.").
56. Perhaps the Court did not use such limiting language self-consciously and instead (and
possibly for the first time) used a variation of "limited to the facts" simply to emphasize the
narrow principle at play. The opinion, notoriously, was written under great time pressure.
See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 174 (2007) ("The liberal and
conservative justices agree today on one thing: If only they had had more time, they would
have produced a better decision."). I am grateful to Orin Kerr for pressing me on this point.
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decide how to interpret Bush v. Gore's limiting language. The Supreme Court
in Bush v. Gore used a common technique (limiting a case to its facts) in a
wholly uncommon way (limiting the case being decided to its facts), and the
result has predictably been confusion. Only a further clarification by the Court
can definitively settle what, exactly, it meant by its words.
CHAD FLANDERS
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